ISGR Analysis and Commentary (secition 1)

Iraq Study Group Report; Analysis and Commentary
12/7/2006


So, as the entire world knows by now, the “Iraq Study Group Report” was released on yesterday. It was expected to be a tool of rebuke for President Bush and his cabinet, including former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld -- any compilation with such “stellar statesmen” on the cover like James A. Baker (the third), Leon Panetta, Charles S. Robb, and Vernon E. Jordan, is bound to produce something of Democrat fodder. The report didn’t disappoint. We could have made Bill Clinton into the entire study group and saved a fortune in fees, and benefits. The report was a 160 page “document dump” only rivaled by Saddam’s file cabinet explosion release to the UN at the beginning of the last Iraq war. As a matter of fact, based on the assumptions of the report they could have release the “Executive Assessment” and the “Assessment” and called it a day instead of stuffing the envelope with rhetorical bubble wrap.

As of this first publication, I have heard no outside commentary on the report. I have wanted to express my own opinion first, before listening to other sources, as a way of checking my own feelings on the lefts' approach to Iraq without hearing the professional pundits.

I have broken down the ISGR into three reports with commentaries. The first, I release here.


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ISGR “Executive Summary”; Commentary and Analysis

(section 1)

The “Executive Summary” (beginning on page xiii thru page xviii) is the Cliff Notes version of the entire report, describing the situation in Iraq and what they, the study group, deem to be necessary to correct the “challenges in Iraq.” The report takes a holistic view of the Middle East as a way to solve the “civil war” and insurgency against the American presence in Iraq; make Syria and Iran our friends, and solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and this will all go away. This is what they bill as the “External Approach.”

“The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should include every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s neighbors and key states in and outside the region should form a support group to reinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its own.”(p.xiv)

This line of thought comes directly after this admission:

“Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect its stability and prosperity. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability.”[Emphasis added.](p.xiv)

So, what we have is a call for “international bi-partisanship.” First, this approach will not work because it is built on the faulty premise that there are no countries in the region that will benefit from a “chaotic Iraq.” This just isn’t true. Iran has a great interest in seeing American forces stuck fighting the insurgency in Iraq, since every soldier stuck there is one less soldier that Iraq might have to face over its nuclear program. It also serves as a training ground for their terrorists, who will use the same tactics in case of an Iranian occupation. Syria, likewise, has no interest really in seeing a democratic and fee Iraq pop up on its borders. Indeed, the mere fact that western powers had a hand in bringing it about has Syria carping about the government being illegitimate and a puppet of the west. They would never stop secretly trying to overthrow the government.

The ISG’s solution to Iran’s “lack of consensus for stability” is “to engage them constructively” (p.xv) by offering Iran protection for its nuclear program:
“Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with
Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.” (p. xv)

Translation: no unilateral action -- (hear us, America) or bi-lateral action (hear us, Israel) -- against the growing threat of a nuclear Iran. The UN Security council should deal with them. Problem is the UN never moves past talking and toothless sanctions, so nothing will be done.

Next, they move on to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:
“The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle
East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and Syria.”(p.xv)
The US can and should complete its mission in Iraq and Afghanistan even if the “Road Map to Peace” is still in detour status. It would be just great if you could fix the un-fixable and bring peace to that region, but you have a better shot of finishing the Iraq and Afghanistan action long before you put an end to the Israel/Palestinian conflict. I would add that the problem with direct talks as they would institute it is that the Palestinians who would accept Israel’s right to exist are not the problem: it’s the OTHER Palestinians who don’t think Israel has a right to exist which are the problem – which is most of the Middle East – that’s the true difficulty of the situation.